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LETTER FROM
ROB NSON AND
BOB MeT E E R
l' Ilouid like to take this opportunity 10
thank Boh BOlkin and Bohln Inman for tlwir many years of leadership of
tilt' Federal I{t'sel"VE' Bank ofDallas during what was prohably its rinest
hours. \\ e Ilere. indeed. fortunate to ha\e at the helm these two leaders al
a tinlt' I\hen cool heads and steady hands were so crucial. We would also
likro to join them in their praise and appreciation of the petformance of all
OUI employees in all our orfiees during the lurhulent 19i1Os.
As Ill' look to tlw future. II(' rind that not alllhe challengps are
Iwhind us. The national l'('Onomy is in a n~e('ssion of unknown depth and
duration. Tlw thrift crisis lingers. and the hanking industry remains
flagile. Fundanll'ntal financial rl"form is imperative, psppcially in the area
ordeposit insurance hut in other arpas as wpll, including the regulatory
stnl('ture. \\ l' have no spe('ific n,rorm program to put rorward at this time,
hut we helil'\(' strongly that the Fedpral Resel"Ve should continue to playa
major role in hank SUppl'\ ision. not only as a Iwcessary adjunct to its
conduct of monetary policy but also I)('caust~ or its roles as hoth lender and
processor of last resort. as dpscrilH'd in the ,j('('ompam ing letler rrom
Admirallrnnan and Boh Boykin.
Tlw Ii nancial histol I of this rpgion in the 1930s reminds us again
or the importalH'e of a ('('ntral hank with a strong regional preSen('l~and
operational roll'. Disruptions in the pavnwnts system. as well as contrac-
tions in til(' nlt'ans of pm ment. (',1Il threatl'n till' financial structure that
supports OUI e('onomic wl·ll-heing. Our regional operations were an
important el('mp11t in pn'lenting till' hanking situation 110m causing these
tyP('S of disluptions. We too hope that whalthis Bank has learrlt'd can
IWlIl,rit otlwrs that mal npprielll'(' similar pn'ssures in the months and
vpats to ('OilH'.
With lilt' abOl,(, in mind. OIH' or the Bank's ohjpctivps in the coming
\p,IIS is to continue oUt I('spareh illto thp natuIl' and (',ltISpS ofour
financial ("isis and possihle lessons and implications lor others and ror
future Ipforln. ,\nothn goal Ill' hale ror tIlt' Balik is hased on an opportu-
nitl lor the rutlll'p ratiwi than a 1'('1 i('11 or the past-that is. the prospect or
a historic fn'(' ttade arrallgptllPllt II iIh N!nico. Ih Iirtu(' of our geographyu,; well a,; OUI intt'rt'';h. WI' hO(lt; that thi,; nunk eun Iw a I('ad('r in (~xplor­
ing j\orlh-South trade' i';';IIP,; and make a contribution t(lIIanl frcer trade
\lith our neighbor,; to 11](' South.
OUt t'xpt'rit'Il("(' in lilt' 19S0,; wa,; a rell1indt'r not only ofthe
importanee ofa ,;trong n>gional prt;,;t'IHT and oIwrational rolt> for our
"deeentralizt'cl central bank" but al,;o of' lilt' important"(· of pri\ate-,;eetOi
partieipation and lilt' ab,;enct' of politieal pre,;,;ure,;. Central bank inde-
p(~ndell("e i,; crucial to 11](' long-run Iwalth ofany t;eonomy. That inclqwn-
dt'I1('(' ean be thrt'alel]('d both bv tho,;e Ilho c()flsciou,;lv wi,;h to thwart it
and by in,;litulional arrangemenh und eircumstanec,; u,; IIPII. Just u,; a
benevolenl depo,;it in';lIrance syslt'm eould help undennine market
diseipline umong bunb und thrifh-ulmo,;1 unnotie(~dover a period of
yt'ur,;-,;o 100 can a mOl]('tarv system bllnlt'necl bv growing budgt't defl('ih
and gOl t'l"nment debt undermine tilt' independence of til(" ct~ntral bank in
ils eondud of mont;lary policy. The a(Tompanying es,;ay in this reporl
aclcln's,;e,; this coneern.
As Ill' mmt' into the 1990,;. lIt' look fOl"Warcl10 ,;erving the in,;litu-
tions and the Iwopl(· of the }]t'vcnth [<,(·deml Re,;er\'f~ Dislrict.
011 J'lI/uon /. /1)1)'- 110). (;1'11. lIugh G. Rohill"In. u.s. :lml)
(relired), assumed Ihe chairmanship ojlhe hoard o/direclors ,flhe Fedeml
Reseu'e !jallk o/lJallas. ojier seu'illl' as a ,lireclorjin siy .1 ears. Roberl n.
l1cTee,. Jr.. he("(Jme /Iresidelll olld chiej I'\eculi, l' ojlicerofIhe Dallas Fed.
elli"'li,'e F('hman /. /1)1)/.
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n.f11 1943 to 1970, our nation's federal budget
ddicit avnaged less than Sl billion annually, only once exceeding $10
billion. Deficits of the 1970s seemed to dwarf those of the previous era,
averaging nearly $30 billion, with a high of$59 billion in 1975. More recent
deficits, howevt~r,dwarfeven those ofthe]970s. Federal budget deficits of
the 1980s averaged mon~ than $]42 billion, and estimates now point to
deficits ofmore than $300 billion in the near-term fiscal years of the 1990s.
When government runs a budgetdeficit, there are two types ofpaper
that can finance that defic·it. One type is interest-bearing paper, known as
government debt and issued by the U.S. Treasury. The otheris non-interest-
bearingpaper, known as money orcurrency and issued by the central bank.I
Creating money-or, in effect, printing currency-is the cheapest way to
finance deficits from a government fiscal standpoint because currency does
not hear interest. Currency creation, however, causes inflation, which
transfers resoU! ces involuntarily from the private sedor to the federal
government.
This essay argm~sthat centred bank independence is more important
today than at any time in history. Becausefiscal incentivesfor inflation grow
as governmentdd)t grows and in view ofthe huge run-up in governmentdebtin the 1980s, with prospects for continued growth in the 1990s, we believe
that the principal mission of our nation's central bank is at risk.
Created to operate independently within government, the Federal
Reserve has as its principal mission the provision of a stable medium of
exchange for the nation-a stable money.2 This is accomplished by the
establishment of currency and by the control of money's value, which, 11\
turn, is accomplished by controlling money's supply.
The central bank'sjob oflimiting the expansion ofmoney, however,
becomes much more difficult in an environment where the volume ofpaper
of the other type-debt-is large and expanding. As government debt
builds, the fiscal benefits from inflation build, creating ever-greater pres-
sure for the monetary authority to inflate.
Our aim in this essay is to provide a convincingcasefor the view that
thepower to spendmane) and thepower to print moneymust beseparateand
independent powers within government. We believe that the separation of
the money-spending and money-printing powers within government I"
essential to the efficient production and allocation of resources in society.
The principal point is that in order to continue to control inflation in the
United States, the independence ofthe Federal Reserve must be preserved.
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INFLATION IS A MONETARY PHENOMENON
Our casehegins with the premise thatinflation is a monetary phenom-
enon. Economists disagree on many propositions. But the oneproposition on
which economistsperhapsmost widely agreeis thatexcessivemoneycreation
is the root cause of inflation.
Inflation is rising prices, but a price is simply the numberofpieces of
paper-Federal Reserve notes, or money-that it takes to buy a good. The
greater the volume of money relative to goods in the economy, the greater is
the price of goods. Inflation results, therefore, when the volume ofmoney in
the economy grows too fast relative to the volume of goods and services.
Evidence from 79countries overthe post-WorldWarII period shows
that when moneygrowth is high, inflationis also high(Chart 1).:!Thedatathus
attest to the premise that excessive money growth causes inflation.
EASY MONEY DOES NOT AID ECONOMIC GROWTH
Although excessive money creation causes inflation, one argument
often given in favor ofexpansionary monetary policy-or"easymoney"-is
that easy money aids economic growth. Economists have not reached a
consensuson this issue, butfew would claim that money growth can provide
any lasting or long-run boost to economic growth.
Economic growth is rising real income, or real earnings; but money
printedis not moneyearned.Thatis to say, themereactofprintingmoney does
not, in and ofitself, change the amount ofgoods and services available in the
economy, nordoes it have any lasting influence on an economy's potential to
produce additional goods and services. Lasting realincome growth canoccur
only when citizens-using their minds, hands, tools, and technology-work
togetherto produceagreatervolumeofgoodsandservices. Whilethecreation
ofa national currency and a monetary and bankingsystem canfacilitate this
process, the excessive creation ofmoney leads only to unstable prices-that
is, to inflation.
Evidencefrom 79countries overthe post-WorldWarII period shows
no generally positive relationship between a country's rate of real economic
growth and its rate ofmoney creation (Chart 2). Real income growth tends to
center in the range of 3 to 5 percent across countries, and countries with
higherratesofreal incomegrowthdo not generallytend to bethosewith higher
rates of money expansion. A more careful look, in fact, would show that as
inflation rises, it can actually lead to a reduction in output and employment.Chart 2
Average Income growth and
currency growth In 79 countries
Income Growth (Percent)
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INFLATION DISRUPTS THE PRODUCTION
AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES IN SOCIETY
Economists have extensively studied how inflation can affect eco-
nomic well-being and have reached considerable agreement.4 Because
inflation's effects are well-documented, we will not attempt to prove them
here.
Among its most widely cited effects, inflation has the tendency to
arbitrarily wipe out the value of income saved in the form of money, and it
shifts real wealth from creditors to debtors. There are otherconsequences as
well. Inflation can lead to a reduction in employment and output. Inflation
transfers resources to the public sector, allowingthe government to be larger
thanit otherwise would bewhilereducingthe purchasingpowerofthe private
sector. Inflation can lead to an inefficient utilization of an economy's
productiveresourcesandtoanincorrectmixofproductioninsociety. In short,
inflation disrupts the production and efficient allocation of resources in
socIety.
WHAT. THEN. IS BEHIND MONEY GROWTH?
Broad-basedevidencesupportstheviewthatwhile money growth and
real economic activity are generally unrelated, money growth causes infla-
tion. Why, then, don't more central banks across the world simply set money
growth at rates that lead to no inflation? Such a policy would provide price
stability,similarto thatexperiencedin JapanandGermany.Theanswer,most
assuredly, lies in government budget deficits and the way they are financed.
Chart 1
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HOW GOVERNMENTS FINANCE BUDGET DEFICITS
Government expenditures can be divided into two broad categories:
governmentpurchases(suchassocialspending,militaryspending,education
outlays) and interest on outstanding government debt. The government
finances these expenditures in basically two ways: by taxation and by
borrowing (Chart 3).
By definition, government runs a budget deficit when expenditures
exceed tax receipts. The government funds the deficit by sales ofdebt to the
private sector. But here's where money creation enters the picture. The
centralbankcandecidetoallowalloftheincreaseinthepublicdebtto remain
outstanding, orit can"monetize"a portion ofthe deficit by, ineffect, printing
currency and purchasing government debt.
To illustrate the implications ofthis choice, consider the example of
a $150 billion U.S. budget deficit (Chart 4). Because government expendi-
tures exceed tax receipts, the Treasury sells $150 billion of newly created
government securities to the private sector, and government debt thereby
increases initially by this amount. The Federal Reserve chooses to respond
by purchasingon the open market, say, $30 billion ofgovernment securities,
using for this purchase $30 billion of newly created Federal Reserve notes
(thatis, currency). Onnet, then,Treasurypaperinthe economy rises by$120
billion, and Federal Reserve paper rises by $30 billion. Two types of paper
are created as a result of the deficit.
GOVERNMENT BUDGET DEFICITS
ARE FINANCED BY CREATING DEBT AND MONEY
Governmentbudgetdeficitsrequirethecreationofgovernment paper.
The central bank cannot determine the total volume of government paper-
money plus debt-in the economy because the central bank doesn't deter-
minethesizeofthedeficit. However,thecentralbankcanandultimatelydoes
determine the extent to which government paper in the economy is debt or
money. This is done by central bank exchanges of government debt for
money-commonly referred to as open market operations.
What determines a central bank's choice of how much money to
create?Can'tthecentralbanksimplyconductmonetarypolicyindependently
offiscal deficitordebt considerations? That is, can'tmoney growth simplybe
restricted to the rate called for to control inflation, regardless of the tax,
spending, and debt policies of government? To answer these questions, it is
important to uncover the fiscal benefits from inflation-specifically, how
money creation lowers the cost to governments of running deficits.HOW GOVERNMENTS BENEFIT FROM INFLATION
Governments derive fiscal benefits from easy monetary policy and
from its implied inflation in several ways. One ofthe more common claims is
thateasymonetarypolicymakes therealeconomystrongerand therebyboosts
the tax base,so as to reduce thefiscal deficit. As arguedearlier,however, easy
moneydoes not provideanylastingorlong-run boostto economicgrowth. We,
therefore, place no relianceon this claim indemonstratinghow governments
benefit from inflation.
More important, and often ignored, are three other basic incentives
that the fiscal authority has for the central bank to inflate: First, inflation
erodes the real value ofoutstanding government debt. Second, central bank
purchases ofgovernment debt lowerthe government's net interest obligation
because the interest on government debt purchased by the central bank is
returned to the government. And third, purchases ofgovernment debt by the
centralbanktend to lowertherealinterestratesatwhichthisdebtisfinanced.
These inducements for inflation can be strong; yet, they are typically either
overlooked or not fully appreciated by many citizens. Let us, therefore,
explore each ofthem more completely.
Chart 4







Inflation erodes the real value ofoutstanding government debt. First, gov-
ernments benefit from easy monetary policy because inflation erodes the real
value ofoutstandinggovernmentdebt. Given today's $2.3 trillion outstanding
stock of public debt, lO-percent inflation, for example, would erase $230
billion in real government obligations annually (Chart 5). This is in contrast
to a fiscal benefit ofjust $52 billion from lO-percent inflation in 1980 and a
fiscal benefit of only $26 billion in 1974. Thus, the fiscal benefits from
inflation from this source have increased greatly in recent years.
Easy money returns more interest payments back to the Treasury. A second
incentive that governments have for the central bank to adopt a looser
monetary stance and to inflate pertains to the matter of interest payments on
outstanding government debt. When the central bank purchases government
debt, the interest payments on that debt return to government. Forall intents
and purposes, the government no longer has an interest obligation on
government debt bought by the central bank.
The Federal Reserve returns to the Treasury virtually every dollar of
interest earned on holdings of government securities (Chart 6). Indeed,
Federal Reserve reimbursements to the Treasury totaled $264.7 billion over
the period 1947-90, and Federal Reserve interest earnings on government
securities totaled $260.5 billion-reflecting virtually complete reimburse-
mentto theTreasuryofFederalReserveinterestearnings:> Thus, thecreation
ofmoney by the Federal Reserve lowers the government's interest obligation.
Easymoneylowerstherealinterestratepaidongovernmentdebt. Government's
third incentivefor the centralbank to adopt an easiermonetary stancerelates
to the matterofinterestratespaidon governmentsecurities. To theextentthat
the central bank can lower the interest rates on government debt through the
purchase of this debt, the government benefits from a reduction in the debt's
interest burden. Though not unanimously accepted among economists, there
isevidencethatthe realfundingcostto theTreasury-thatis, the realinterest
rate on government securities-is directly related to the stock ofgovernment
debt in the economy and inversely related to the stock of money in the
economy.
The Federal Reserve increases the quantity of money through open
marketoperations. In essence, the FederalReserve'sopen marketoperations
replace government debt with newly issued currency, thereby decreasing the
amount of government debt relative to money in the economy. By the same
token, open market operations, by reducing government debt outstanding,
decrease the amount of government debt relative to gross national product(GNP). J)pclint's in t'ithf'rral io IlPnf'fitthegovt'rnnwnl with lowf'rrt'al funding
costs; Ihat is. thereis a nolin'ahlf'correlation bt'lwt't'n pi Iherratioand thp!"pal
Chart 7
Debt·to-money ratio, debt·to-GNP ratio,
and the real interest rate
intf'resl ralt' on govf'rnnlf'nl dpbt (Chart 7). [n this way, an easier monptary
policy would further rpdm'p Ill(' cost to governnlPnt offinancing its dpficits.
In addition to tllf' n~al inlf'rf'st rate effect caust'd by Ihe substilution of
monf'y [or debt, the governlllpnl's inlf'rest cosls art' rt'duced because activf'
cenlral hank participation in govprnment bond markptsincreases till:' markpt-
ahility and liquidity of govprnnwnt debt. In so doing, Ihe cf'ntral hank
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enhan('ps lhe attractivf'npss ofowning governlllf'nt df'lJt, which makes invps-
lors willing to accept a lowt'r intprpst return relativt' to lhat of other invt'sl-
ments. This liquidity eflt'l'l rpinlilr('t's thp dpsirahility, from the governmt'nt's
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WHAT DO RECENT FISCAL POLICIES IMPLY
FOR GOVERNMENT'S INCENTIVES TO INFLATE?
We have argued that an inflationary monetary policy lowers the cost
thatgovernmentsface forcontinuallyrunningbudgetdeficits. Areason, then,
why more central banks across the world don'tsimply setmoney growth so as
to have no inflation is that there are fiscal benefits-benefits that accrue to
the fiscal authorities-from a loosermonetary policy and the central bank is
often obliged or even pressured-directly or indirectly-to help solve the
government's fiscal problem. Such pressures can beexhibited in a variety of
ways: through legislationorconstitutionalprovisionsthatmandatethepursuit
offiscal objectives by the centralbank, through participationoffiscal agents
in monetary policy-makingatthecentralbank,orthrough suchsubtle means
asthecentralbankattemptingto holddowninterestratesintheface ofa rising
public debt.
6
In ourown nation, with recent huge increases in budget deficits and
an expanding public debt, we believe that the fiscal pressures for inflation
have intensified.
BUDGET DEFICITS OF THE 1980S WOULD HAVE PRODUCED
SUSTAINED DOUBLE-DIGIT INFLATION
To get some idea of just how great the fiscal pressures for inflation
have been recently, it is useful to consider three hypothetical monetary
policies-policies that the Federal Reserve could have followed over the
period 1980-90. We emphasize that these are policies that the Federal
Reserve could have followed to help fund the fiscal budget deficits and ease
the Treasury's financing burden:
7
POLICY A: Maintain the economy's ratio ofgovernment debt to money.
POLICY B: Maintain the economy's ratio ofgovernment debt to GNP.
POLICY C: Monetize a constant share ofthefiscal budget deficit.
The first two policies are important to consider because either might have
helpedholddown the increaseinrealTreasuryinterestratesduringthe1980s
and thereby might have reduced the Treasury's funding costs.Chart 9
Actual and simulated prices
Index, 1982 =100
400
Financing a Constant Share (36%) of Deficit
Keeping Debt-to-GNP Ratio Constant
Keeping Debt Relative to Money Constant
Actual
The third policy we consider is onf' in which thf' Ff'df'ral Bt'serve
conlinut'd to monf'tize gOYf'rnment budget deficits in the 1980s 10 the same
dt'gree as previously-say. from 1950 to 1979. Forthe :)O-year period before
1980. the Federal Resen'e monetized. on average. roughly ~6 pern'nt of
budget deficits. the remaining 64 pl"rcent being financed by il1l"l"l.>ases in
privateholdingsofpublicdebt. Duringthl" 1980-90period. bowPvl"r. Fl"deral
Besf'rve monetization of deficits fell to only 11 percent (CharI 8).
Underthese policies, threedistinctlydifferent pricepaths would have
occurred over the ]980-90 period-all significantly higher than actual
experience(Chart 9). Had the Federal Reservecontinued to monetize roughly
:36 percentofthedeficit (policy C), the fiscal deficits ofthe period would havp
led to inflation rates averaging nearly 13 percentfor the decade, with a peak
inflation rate of more than 21 percent in ]982 and 1983. Had thp Fl"deral
Rpsprvp, instead, acted to maintain thl" economy's stock of deht JPlativp to
monl"y at its ll"vd at thl" end of the 1970s (policy A), inflation would havl"
averagl"d more than 10 percent for the period, reaching a peak of J6 pelTent
in 1981. And hadthe FederalReservetried to avoid a risingdebt-to-GNPratio
(policy 8). the fiscal deficits would havl" implied an average of more than 9-
pprcent inflation flll the period. with a high of 17 percent in ]982.
Chart 8























THE FISCAL PRESSURE FOR INFLATION CONTINUES
TO BUILD AS GOVERNMENT DEBT BUILDS
What the Federal Reserve actually did over the past decade was to
pursue none of these hypothetical policies but a comparatively independent
monetary policy-which resulted in slower money growth than under any of
the alternatives. And inflation for the period averaged only 4Y2 percent. This
result was accomplished by the Federal Reserve adopting a path for the
supply of money that did not mirror the path ofgovernment debt (see Charts
5, 7, and 8). The Federal Reserve did not monetize the huge increases in
government debt and, consequently, did not impose double-digit rates of
inflation on the economy. But because of the refusal to monetize the fiscal
budget deficits, their legacy is still with us today in the form ofa huge stock
of outstanding government debt. The pressure for the Federal Reserve to
inflate still exists and, indeed, continues to build as government debt swells.
IS THERE AWAY OUT?
Dofiscal deficitsobligethe centralbank to inflate? Evidencefrom 17
OECD countries for the period 1973-86 indicates that there tends to be no
clear relationship between a country's inflation rate and its deficit-to-GNP
ratio (Chart 10).8 The Netherlands and Belgium, for example, have relatively
high deficit-to-GNP ratios but have relatively low rates of inflation, while
Norway and Finland have relatively low deficit-to-GNP ratios but have
relatively high inflation rates. What, then, enables some countries, but not
others, to have low inflation rates despite high deficits?
THE ANSWER IS CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
The answer, we believe, lies in the degree of central bank indepen-
dence.9 The evidence points to a clear correlation between central bank
independence and inflation (Chart 11). When central bank independence is
high, inflation is generally low. But when the central bank is more tied to the
fiscal objectives of government, higher inflation typically results.
1
I ,CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE
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TllP cOllclusion \I!' cOInI" to is straightforward. C('nlral hank illdep(>I1-
al arm's If'ngth. The conclusion, we believe, is clt'ar:
('onlrollingllw prinlingpressmusl not be lh"sanwonf' makingoUlllwhudgl'l.
df']H'f' is the key to controlling inflation. Within gO\ 1"1'1lIIlPnI, tllf' agf'lH'~
The Iwoplf' who print money andthose \Iho sfwnd it muslnollw the salllP. and
institutional alTangf'ments musthe carefully constnH't"d 10 kf'f'p hoth groups
Monev crt~ation i~ onl" way of paying for a fiseal hudget dl"fi(·11.
Inflation (Percent)
Money ('rl"ation is the cheapest, most l"xpedient way lo pa~,
as vif'w(~d from the standpoint of governml"nts.
MOI]('y (']{'alion. hOI\l"ver. causes inflation. In fact. it is lhrough
innatioll lhal govl"rnmenls' fiscal benefits largely a(·cl'[Jf'.
TllP fiscal il1('f'ntil'f's and prl"ssures fiJr inflation gnJl\ as
hudgf'l df'ficits I ise and governnlPnt debt builds.
And gInerlllllf'nl df'hl in tht' Cnited Statt's has escalated
sharply in rf'cent veal's.
Thus. the indf'pf']Hlf'ncf' oj thl" Federal Resl"!V'l" within gove]nllwlll IS mOl(>
f'ssf'lllialthan ('IeI' if inflation is lo he kt'pt under control.
Chart 10
Government deficit relative to GNP































This essay was taken from the study, "Two Types ofPaper. A Primer on the Necessity of Central Bank tndependence, " written by W. Michael Cox,
delivered to the board ofdirectors at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas on February 8, 1990, and presented at the Annual Directors' Conference hosted
by the Federal Reserve Board, April26, 1990
Chertnote.
Chart 1
Data are from Robert J Barra, Macroeconomics, 3d ed See endnotes 1 and 3
Chart 2
Data are from Robert J Barro, Macroeconomics, 3d ed, See endnotes 1and 3
Chart 5
Outstanding government debt is measured as the par value ofprivately heldgross federal debt Statistics are available from the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas See also W. Michael Cox and Cara S Lawn, "The Capital Gams and Losses on US Government Debt: 1942-1981," Review of Economics and
Statistics, vol 11 (February 1989), pp 1-14
Chari 6
Interest earned on government securities held by the Federal Reserve and Federal Reserve reimbursements to the Treasury are available from Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Annual Report. 1945-90 (Washington, 0 C Board of Governors, 1946-91), table lilled "Income and Expenses
ofFederal Reserve Banks" Also, see endnote 5
Chart 1
Real ;nterest cost is measured as the interest rate on one-year constant maturity Treasury securities, adjusted for inflation The debt-fa-money ratio is the
par value ofprivately heldgovernment debt divided by the St Louis Fed monetary base The debt·to-GNP ratio is the par value ofprivately held
government debt divided by gross nalional product
Chart8
Monetizalion percentages for 1950-79 are calculated as the total increase in base money from 1950 through 1919 divided by the cumulative (30-year)
federal budget deficit A similar procedure was used for Ihe period 1980-90
Chart 9
Actual price data are the GNP deflator See endnote 7 for a description of the procedure used to simulate prices
Chart 10
Deficit-la-GNP ratios are calculated as federal bUdget deficits divided by GNP for each country Data are from International Financial Statistics
(International Monetary Fund) Data on inflation are from Alberto Alesina, "Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies' See endnote 9
Chart 11
See endnote 9 for the description and source of the data
Endnote.
The currency measure of money used throughout this essay is typically referred to as base money Base money is currency held by the non-bank
private sector pfus reserves of banks In an open market purchase of government securities, the Federal Reserve must create currency or the equivalent
ownership thereof This currency can be held by Ihe non-bank private sector (currency outSide Ihe bankmg system), or It can be owned by banks and
held either as reserves or "on deposit' with the Federal Reserve (currency inSide the banking system) Thus, base money and the definition of currency
used here are the same
To paraphrase Section 8(5) of the United States Constitution The Congress shall have power to coin money and regUlate the value thereof. With the
creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1914, the Congress delegated its responsibifity in this area to the Federal Reserve In so doing, the Congress
sanctioned the separation of its spending decisions from deciSions regarding the way in which such spending would be financed
The countries referred to here and also in Charts 1 and 2 are of atl types-devefoped, underdeveloped, agricultural, industrialized, and so on Data
are from Robert J Barra, Macroeconomics 3d ed (New York John Wiley and Sons, 1990), pp 153-54
4 For an excellent compilation of the effects of mflation the reader is directed to Stanley Fischer and Franco Modigliani, "Towards an Understanding of
the Real Effects and Costs ofInflation, Weltwirtschaftllches Archiv, vol 114 (1978), pp 810-32
!l Over the period 1947-88, Federal Reserve reimbursements to the Treasury tolaled $219.4 billion, and Federal Reserve interest earnings on
government secunties totaled $220.4 billion, for a roughly dollar-far-dollar ratio As fang as the Federal Reserve has significant operating expenses, it
cannot return the fulf value of its interest earnings to the Treasury unless it has additional sources of income, such as discount window earnings orprofits
from priced services In recent years, these other sources of income have roughly approximated the Federal Reserve's operating expenses Over the
past two years, profits from operations in foreign exchange markets have added substantially to reimbursements in excess of interest earnings See the
March 1991 Federal Reserve Bulletin, p 174, for a review of 1990 Income and expenses
6 Raben 0 McTeer, Jr, in "Interest Rates and the Federal Reserve" Syllogisms, Council on Economic Education in Maryland (Towson State University),
May/June 1982) discusses the issue of pressures that deficits may put on interest rates and the Implications of deficits for monetary policy For a relaled
discussion, see Sherman J Maiset, Managing the Dollar (New York W W Norian and Company, 1973)
The economy's hypothesized price paths were simulated by using the quantity equation of exchange Denoting M as the stock of currency (actually,
base money-see endnote 1), Vas the velocity of money (the average number of times that a unit of currency changes hands per year), y as the
economy's annual real GNP, and P as the price level, the quantity equation says thai MoV must equal poy, so that P must equal MoVly As an admittedly
crude approximation, we estimated P by employing thiS Identity, using the actual values for Vandy dunng Ihe 1980-90 period, and wilh money
conforming to whatever values were required in order to satisfy either poliCY A, policy B, orpolicy C (as outlmed in the text), given the actual deficits for
the 1980-90 period For policy A, budget defiCits were presumed to be linanced by debt and money In the proportion necessary to leave the economy's
Slack ofmoney relative 10 debt unchanged at its pre-1980 ralio (ItS ralio at Ihe end of 1979) For policy B, budget deficits were presumed to be fmanced
with debt to the degree necessary to maintain government debt relative to GNP at its pre-1980 ratio (the remainder of the debt being financed by money
creation) For policy C. budgel deficits were assumed 10 be financed 36 percent With money creation and 64 percent With debllssuance
IJ OECo refers to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development See endnote 9
9 Rankings ofcentral bank independence shown in Chart 11 are from Robin Bade and Michael Parkin, "Central Bank Laws and Monetary Poltcy"
(Universityol Western Ontario, Department ofEconomics, London, Ontario, Canada, June 1987, Photocopy), as mterpreled by Alberto Alesina, "Politics
and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies," Economic Policy, April 1989, p 81 Data on inflalion shown in Charts 10 and 11 are from Alesina
Independence of the central bank from Ihe execulive branch ofgovernment is classified Inlo four categories, trom most independenl (Category I) 10 least
independent (Calegory IV) Calegory I-Switzerland and Germany, Category II-Japan and the United Slates, Category III-the Netherlands, Belgium,
Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, France, Finland, and the Uniled Kingdom; and Category IV-Australia, New Zealand, Spain, and Italy See also
"Wise Men from Ihe South, "The Economist, February 2, 1991, P 77I,r;
N G L 0 B U NEW
n 1921, the Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas opened the doors of its new building at 400 South Akard Sl.
and began an era offinancial leadership in the Southwest. In the
summer of 1992, this leadership will be reaffirmed symbolically
when the new headquarters building at 2200 Pearl St. is completed.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
approved the plans and budget for the new Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas headquarters building in February 1989. As a result, a
building site at the northeast corner of Woodall Rodgers Freeway
and Pearl Street in downtown Dallas was purchased. The
groundbreaking ceremony was held June 14, 1990.
Kohn Pedersen Fox Associates of New York designed the new
building. The final building design documentation and implemen-
tation are being handled by Sikes Jennings Kelly & Brewer of
Houston. Austin Commercial of Dallas is managing general
contracting services. "We wanted the design to be timeless-
expressing strength, stability and dignity. It has to communicate the
strong, independent culture of the Southwest and incorporate all the
new technology available to meet the needs of the Dallas Fed for
the next 25 years," says Richard Floyd, project manager for the
building during planning and the early stages ofconstruction.
Throughout the 764,000-square-foot building, public and
private areas have been thoughtfully intermingled to achieve a
sense ofcommunity while providing the utmost security to sensitive
areas.
The building will offer a panoramic view of downtown Dallas
and will be near both the Arts District and the historic State-
Thomas neighborhood. This location allows the Dallas Fed and its
people to remain an integral part of downtown while taking
advantage of the cultural assets of their neighbors.in the District elect Class A and B directors, while the Board of
bring to the boards a broad range ofexpertise. The nine directors of
the Head Office board are divided into three classes of three
come from such backgrounds as agriculture, commerce, industry,






President and ChiefCredil Officer














Maj. Gen Hugh G. Robinson
U.S. Army (retired)
Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer
The Tetra Group Inc
Dallas, Texas
Charles T. Doyle










Federal Reseroe Bank ofDallas
Head Offu:e
o o F BOA R 0
ach Federal Reserve Bank has a nine-
each-Classes A, Band C. Class A directors represent the member
commercial banks throughout the District and are usually bankers.
Class Band C directors are selected to represent the public and
member board of directors that oversees operations under the
general supervision of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System in Washington, D.C. These directors are chosen to
represent various interests and concerns within their District and
Governors appoints Class C directors.
Directors who serve on the boards of Federal Reserve
Branches are not elected but are appointed by the members of the
Head Office board of directors or by the Board of Governors. These
seven-member boards consist of four members appointed by the
Head Office board and three members appointed by the Board of
Governors. The Branch board members also are chosen to represent
banking as well as public and business interests.
Each board meets once a month, and the members confer on
Reserve Bank management decisions as well as economic conditions
and monetary policy. Board members playa direct role in the Bank's
management because they are responsible for appointing the Reserve
Bank president and first vice president, subject to the approval of the
Board ofGovernors, and for appointing all other officers ofthe Bank.
They are responsible for the Bank's budget and expenditures and, in
addition, review the annual internal audit program.
Directors playa vital role in the formulation ofmonetary
policy through their advice and counsel to the Reserve Bank
president. They provide firsthand economic and financial informa-
tion as input for meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee-
the top monetary policy-making unit of the Federal Reserve
System. In addition, directors recommend, subject to review and
determination by the Board of Governors, the discount rate to be






Chairman of the Board
Tanglewood Bank, N A.
Houston, Texas
Leo E. I.inbeck, Jr.















Federal Advisory Couru:il Member
Ronald G. Steinhart

































First National Bank ofJaeksonville
Jacksonville. Texas
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Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.
Austin, Texas
Gregory W. Crane
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Financiallnstiluticns
James A. Altick
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NCNB Texas National Bank
Dallas, Texas
James L. Hawkins, Jr.
Senior Vice President














First City National Bank of Houston
Houston. Texas
Lowell Smith, Jr.
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Zuniga Freight Services Inc.
Laredo, Texas
Effective January I, 1990
.vIS TAT E MEN T o F CONDITION
ASSETS
Gold certificatt' accountI
Special drawing rights rt'rtificate account"
Coin














































































'This Bank's share ofgold certificate... deposited by the U.8. Treasury with the Federal R(~senJe Sptem.
2This Bank's share ofspecial drawing rights certificates dep(Hited l)y the U.S. Trl'aslu) with the Federnl Re.'ieroe Bank ofNew York.STATEMENT
CURRENT INCOME
Interest on loans
Interest on government securities
Income on foreign currency






Current net operating expenses




For ,he year eruled December 31
1990 1989
(ThoUJands) (ThoUJands)






$ 92,358 $ 87,616
6,3:i6 6,061
$ 86,022 $ 81,555
6,848 7.1.744
$ 92,870 $ 89,299
$ 932,454 $1,167,284
PROFIT AND LOSS
Additions to currenl net income:
Profit on sales ofgovernment securities (net)
Profit on foreign exchange transactions (net)
Other additions
Total additions
Deductions from current net income:




Cost ofnonreimbursable Treasury services
Assessment by Board of Governors:
Expenditures
Federal Reserve currency costs
NET INCOME AVAILABLE FOR DISTRIBUTION
S 2,240 $ 25
162,594 92,320
41 16




$ 164,873 $ 92,360
$ 4,278 $ 2,777








Net income available for distribution
LESS:
Dividends paid
Payments to the U.S. Treasury















v 0 L U M E 0 F 0 P E R A T I 0 N S
District Summary
Number ofPieces Handled Dollar Amount (Thou.sands)
1990 1989 1990 1989
Currency received and counted 959,597,700 1,012,861,100 13,559,912 14,412,556
Coin received and counted 727,955,791 803,788,459 111,793 149,561
Food stamps redeemed 319,719,912 248,706,000 1,672,384 1,284,487
Transfers of funds 6,747,065 6,717,474 10.368,347,128 10,566,952,229
CHECKS HANDLED
U.S. government checks 34,397,594 33,762,656 49,144,367 44,881,991
Fine sort 383,290,202 313,701,988 96,459,566 84,985,195
All othd 1,129,534,456 1,109,788,622 570,465,998 575,841,535
ACH ITEMS HANDLED
Commercial 91,458,412 77,391,770 378,729,990 333,366,399
Government 41,739,399 33,996,160 39,044,581 27,073,447
COLLECTION ITEMS HANDLED
U.S. government coupons paid 17,827 19,682 22,736 10,483




Definitive and book-entry 6,350,898 8,417,607 765,177,143 511,327,620
LOANS
Advances made 1,750 ,2.15 4,591,018 150,928,502
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